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BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff-Appellant does not seek rehearing with 
respect to this Court's determination that by acceptance of 
rent plaintiff has waived the forfeiture of the lease and its 
determination that there is no covenant, express or implied, 
to maximize rentals or to operate the theatre in "a prudent 
and businesslike manner." In its attempt to reargue this case 
plaintiff now contends that it has the right to collect damages 
it claims to now suffer for alleged breaches of the covenants 
to maintain and repair the theatre. It seeks other damages 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
separate and apart from any resulting diminution of percentage 
rental. Its petition for rehearing concedes the correctness 
of the decision in all respects except the "single issue . . . 
of its claim for actual damages" for this alleged breach. 
Plaintiff Should Not Be Permitted 
to Reargue the Case by Now Shifting 
the Theory of its Case 
The reference now to "actual damages" is an attempt 
to sidestep the position taken by plaintiff earlier before this 
Court and the trial court and to avoid the clearly correct 
ruling (now finally conceded by plaintiff) that there is no 
implied covenant to operate the theatre in a "prudent and 
businesslike manner" so as to maximize percentage rentals. 
Plaintiff clearly spelled out its damage theory 
both in oral argument and in its briefs. Plaintiff's reply 
brief, for example, explains its position: 
". . . it is Woodland's complaint that through 
improper maintenance and neglect of the physical 
plant of the theatre, Plitt allowed the business 
of the theatre to deteriorate so that Woodland's 
receipts under the percentage rental provisions 
of the lease were artificially limited . . . . 
The derelictions of the defendants-respond-
ents Plitt and ABC responsible for limiting 
Woodland's receipts under the percentage rental 
provisions of the lease agreement have been 
previously outlined in appellant Woodland's 
initial brief to this Court. What Woodland 
is asking for is damages resulting from Plitt's 
and ABC's failure to operate the Drive-in 
Theatre in a prudent and businesslike fashion." 
Appellant's Reply Brief, pages 8-9 (Emphasis added). 
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Also this is clearly the thrust of plaintiff's complaint 
(See paragraph 13 and 14 of complaint quoted at page 37 of 
Respondent's Brief in this court). Plaintiff's entire claim 
for damage was premised on its argument that the alleged 
failure to maintain the theatre according to the standard 
demanded by plaintiff injured plaintiff by a diminution of 
percentage rental and that there was an implied obligation to 
operate so as to maximize the percentage rental. Being told 
again now that this just is not the law, plaintiff wants to 
shift its theory and take another bite at the apple. 
The Court correctly perceived plaintiff's argument 
and correctly ruled upon it, and plaintiff should not now be 
permitted to further prolong the agony in this case (filed 
in the summer of 1974) with reargument. 
The Court's Ruling Was 
Correct; Even Plaintiff's 
New Theory is Erroneous 
Although respondent does not accede to plaintiff's 
contention that even though the acceptance of rent waives the 
forfeiture it does not waive the underlying breach, it is 
conceded that the cases on this issue are few (perhaps because 
if the waiver is such as to waive the forfeiture it has been 
assumed that it waived the breach and landlords have not 
- 3 -
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attempted to gain damages when they have not been permitted to 
forfeit.) For several reasons, however, even accepting the 
correctness of the Court's ruling on that point, the Court 
was correct in affirming the summary judgment. 
It must be noted that even plaintiff makes no effort 
to claim damages for, and concedes that it has waived, one of 
the main breaches it asserted, that is the alleged sublease 
or assignment. Obviously there can be no damage here because 
all that plaintiff is entitled to is the rent and it is receiving 
and accepting rent from the alleged subtenant. 
The Court correctly noted that it makes a difference 
what damages one seeks. As noted above plaintiff's case rests 
upon the claim for percentage rent, the contention being that 
defendant is required to operate in a manner to maximize the 
rent and if all the things were done which plaintiff alleges 
in the complaint were not done, plaintiff would get more 
percentage rent. The Court has correctly ruled, and in its 
Petition for Rehearing plaintiff so concedes, that there is no 
implied covenant as plaintiff previously contended. 
In its Petition for Rehearing and the supporting 
brief plaintiff states its new position to include the contention 
that it should recover "actual damages resulting from a failure 
- 4 -
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to repair and maintain the theatre11 (page 5) and points to 
the portions of the complaint alleging that defendant breached 
the lease by failing "to improve, properly care for, and 
maintain the theatre in a good state of repair and by allowing 
the theatre to deteriorate and remain in a position of disrepair." 
The case relied upon by plaintiff involved a substan-
tial physical alteration of the premises made by the tenant 
contrary to an express prohibition in the lease prohibiting 
structural change. It did not involve the usual covenant 
concerning maintenance and surrender of the premises in good 
repair. Moreover, as pointed out in defendant's opening brief 
(page 6) the record shows substantial expenditures by the 
defendant to make certain that it had cured within the grace 
period given in the lease even the tenuous claims of this 
landlord. In addition, as pointed out in footnote 2 at page 
5 of our opening brief, some of the matters with respect to 
repair raised in plaintiff's brief involve worn out parts 
of the premises that cannot be repaired and need to be replaced. 
As there pointed out, under case law it is the landlords1s 
and not the tenant's responsibility to replace worn out parts 
of the premises. 
The paragraph of the lease necessarily relied on 
by the plaintiff for its newly asserted claim for damages 
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(paragraph 8) concludes with the requirement that ffat the 
expiration of the lease, lessee agrees to surrender 
possession to lessor of the said premises and the improvements 
and equipment upon said premises in a good state of repair, 
ordinary wear and tear, acts of God and damage by fire or 
other insured casualty excepted." This covenant necessarily 
applies to all other covenants in the lease pertaining to repair 
and maintenance because all such covenants in a lease must be 
construed together. A breach of these covenants can occur only 
at the end of the lease when surrender is to be made. Thus, 
even accepting plaintiff's allegation that the fence has not 
been painted, or the roadway repaired, etc., plaintiff has 
no claim for damage unless and until the lease is terminated 
and the premises are surrendered in condition less than required 
by the lease. 
The landlord does not have a present interest in 
the leasehold -- his is only a reversionary interest and that 
interest can be damaged only when the reversion occurs and 
the premises are not then, as the lease requires, "in a good 
state of repair, ordinary wear and tear, acts of God and 
damage by fire or other insured casualty excepted." 
- 6 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Under the circumstances of this case, all that 
plaintiff is entitled to now is the rents which the tenant 
covenants to pay. Plaintiff continues to receive those rents 
(including the fixed rental and a very substantial amount in 
percentage rental) and has no claim for damages. 
The petition for rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHR1STENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN & EVANS 
T R . Gardiner, Jr. 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ day of February, 1977 
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